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O'Connor: Tort Law

LAST CALL: THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT TURNS OUT THE LIGHTS ON
FIRST-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION

AGAINST TAVERN* OWNERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early afternoon of May 3, 1989, Robert L. Tobias began a
fateful drinking binge on a golf course in Columbia, South Carolina, and
continued his consumption of alcohol at three different bars. While attempting
to drive home, Tobias crossed the center line and hit another vehicle head on,
killing one of its occupants and seriously injuring a second.' In April of 1992,
Tobias and his wife sued the owners of the last two bars that served him
alcoholic beverages the night of the crash,2 claiming that the bartenders'
negligence in serving the already intoxicated Tobias caused his injuries and his
wife's loss of consortium.3 The Tobiases based their claims on the bartenders'
alleged violations of sections 61-5-30 and 61-9-410 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina ("Code").4 However, though this cause of action was viable
* This Comment uses the term "tavern" to refer generally to any bar or restaurant or
other establishment that sells alcoholic beverages foron-premises consumption. "Tavernowner"
as used in this Comment means the owner or owners ofa tavern as well as managers, bartenders,
and servers.
1. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 323 S.C. 345, 347,474 S.E.2d 450, 450-51 (Ct. App.
1996), aff'd as modified, 332 S.C. 90,504 S.E.2d 318 (1998). Tobias was convicted for felony
driving under the influence and "was sentenced to 3 years and $3,000. He served 7 months jail
time followed by 11 months work restriction while living at home." Brief for Respondent at 11
n.9.
2. The second bar Tobias visited, The Sports Club, was later dismissed from the suit
with prejudice. See Brief for Respondent at 2-3.
3. See id. at2n.3.
4. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 61-5-30, -9-410 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (current versions at S.C.
CODEANN. §§ 61-4-580, -6-1800,-6-2220, -6-4710 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998)). Formersection
61-9-410 provided, in pertinent part:
No holder of a permit authorizing the sale
of beer or wine or any servant, agent, or employee of
thepermittee shall knowingly do any ofthe following
acts upon the licensed premises covered by the
holder's permit:
(2) sell beer or wine to any person while
the person is in an intoxicated condition;
A violation of any of the foregoing
provisions is a ground for the revocation or
suspension of the holder's permit.
§ 61-9-410. Section 61-9-410 applied only to beer and wine, while § 61-5-30 applied to distilled
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under Christiansen v. Campbell,5 the defendants asserted the affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk." The jury
returned a verdict for the defendants, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals
aTred.7
The Tobiases appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
affirmed the court of appeals with a key modification! While preserving a
cause of action against taverns for third parties injured by someone who was
served while intoxicated, the court adopted the position of the majority of
Americanjurisdictions in holding that intoxicatedpatrons themselves, thefirstparty plaintiffs (including their families or estates), can no longer recover
against taverns for their own injuries.9 The court's holding altered the
landscape oftavern liability in South Carolina and sent a clear message that the
party is now over for patrons who drink to excess and later attempt to sue the
serving tavern for their injuries."0
The supreme court's opinion in Tobias is brief and somewhat
conclusory. Though the decision involves a number of important
issues-including statutory interpretation, legislative intent, the doctrine of
negligence per se, civil liability created by violation of a penal statute, civil

spirits. It provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person to
possess or consume any alcoholic liquors upon any
premises where such person has been forbidden to
possess or consume alcoholic liquors by the owner,
operator or person in charge of the premises.
No person or establishment licensed to sell
alcoholic beverages pursuant to this article shall sell
suchbeverages to persons in an intoxicated condition
and such sales shall be deemed violations of the
provisions thereof and subject to the penalties
contained herein.

§ 61-5-30.
5. 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985). Christiansenestablished a cause
of action in favor of first-party plaintiffs (the intoxicated patrons themselves) against tavern
owners. See discussion infra Part I.B.
6. The events which led to this action occurred before South Carolina's adoption of
the doctrine of comparative negligence in Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399
S.E.2d 783 (1991). Had the cause of action arisen after the adoption of comparative negligence,
the plaintiffs contributory negligence and assumption of the risk would have been factors for
the jury to consider in determining the parties' percentage of fault rather than affirmative
defenses. Nelson merged the two doctrines into the law of comparative negligence, but they
remained affirmative defenses at the time of the crash in Tobias.
7. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 323 S.C. 345,347,356,474 S.E.2d 450,451,456 (Ct.
App. 1996), aff'd as modified, 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998).
8. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 90, 504 S.E.2d 318, 318 (1998).
9. See id. at 92-93, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
10. The supreme court declined to rule on whether a tavern is subject to first-party
liability for the negligent fumishing of alcohol to a minor, stating that it would leave that issue
"for another day." Id. at 93, 504 S.E.2d at 320. For that reason, this Comment does not
specifically address the issue of first-party liability as applied to minors.
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duty in tort, and the regulation of alcohol generally-the opinion lacks the
more thorough analysis found in prior decisions by appellate courts in South
Carolina" and in other states.' 2Though its position is certainly clear, the court's
failure to elaborate renders the opinion less credible and invites criticism.
This Comment discusses the issues raised by the supreme court in
Tobias and compares the supreme court's new position to those taken in other
jurisdictions. For perspective, this Comment includes a brief history of tavern
or dram shop' 3 liability in the United States, as well as a discussion of the
history of tavern liability in South Carolina. Following an analysis of
significant South Carolina case law, up to and including Tobias, this Comment
argues that, despite the relatively brief and conclusory nature of its opinion, the
supreme court reached the correct conclusion in Tobias.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TAVERN LIABILIY INTHE UNITED
STATES

A.

Common Law

At common law in American jurisdictions, neither a first-party patron
nor a third party injured as a result of the patron's intoxication had a cause of
action against a tavern because of the tavern's serving the already intoxicated
patron.' 4 Courts generally pointed to at least one of three reasons for denying
recovery against the tavern as a matter of law: (1) the patron who drank the

11. See Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 306 S.C. 51,53-55,410 S.E.2d 251,252-53 (1991);
Norton v. Opening Break, Inc., 313 S.C. 508, 510-13,443 S.E.2d 406,407-09 (Ct App. 1994),
aftd, 319 S.C. 469,462 S.E.2d 861 (1995); Daley v. Ward, 303 S.C. 81, 83-87, 399 S.E.2d 13,
14-16 (CLApp. 1990); Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164,167-70,328 S.E.2d 351,354-55
(Ct. App. 1985).
12. See Noonan v. Galick, 112 A.2d 892, 894-95 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955); Wright v.
Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 555-59 (Del. 1981); Bertelmann v. Taas Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 933-35
(Haw. 1987); Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 347-49 (Miss. 1986); Smith
v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1297-99 (Ohio 1990); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813
P.2d 508, 509-12 (Okla. 1991); Estate of Kelly v. Falin, 896 P.2d 1245, 1247-50 (Wash. 1995).
13. A dram shop is an establishment "where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities,
to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying." Crowleyv. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890). In Tobias, the court of appeals distinguished between "dram shop acts"
(those statutes which specifically provide for civil causes of action) and "penal or beverage
control statutes" (those which provide for criminal or civil penalties against taverns, but which
do not specifically permit civil lawsuits by injured parties). Tobias v. Sport's Club, Inc., 323
S.C. 345,348-49,474 S.E.2d 450,451-52 (CLApp. 1996), aff'd as modified, 332 S.C. 90,504
S.E.2d 318 (1998). This Comment abides by that distinction. Thus, South Carolina does not
actually have a "dram shop act." Tavern liability has instead been judicially created by allowing
a civil cause ofaction in tort based on a tavern owner's violation of the penal orbeverage control
statutes. S.C. CODE.ANN. §§ 61-4-580, -6-2220 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
14. Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liabilityfor Dispensing Alcohol: A
Comparative Study, 8 REV. LmG. 1, 3 (1988); George B. Apter, Recent Development,
Bertelmann v. Taas Associates: Limits on Dram Shop Liability; BarringRecovery of Bar
Patrons,Their Estates and Survivors, 11 U. HAW. L. REV.277,280 (1989).
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alcohol was a "strong and able-bodied man" deemed capable of his own care
and safety; 5 (2) the proximate cause of the ensuing injury was the patron's
consumption ofthe alcohol rather than the tavern's serving it; 6 (3) the patron's
or third party's subsequent injury was not foreseeable given the separation in
time and distance between the serving of the alcohol and the injury.' 7
B.

Early Dram Shop Acts

The initial legislative abrogation of the common-law rule of tavern
nonliability was Wisconsin's enactment of the first dram shop act in 1849.1"
This statute and others of its era urged moderation by imposing strict liability
on tavern owners for injuries to third parties caused by intoxicated patrons the
tavern had served. 9 However, state legislatures began to repeal many of the
early dram shop acts with the end of Prohibition in 1933, and by 1978, only
eighteen states still maintained dram shop acts. No state enacted a dram shop
act from 1935 to 1978, when California did so.2"
C.

The Demise of Common-Law Nonliability

In the late 1950s, courts began reviewing and questioning the
common-law rule of nonliability.2 ' In 1959, two landmark decisions, Waynick
v. Chicago'sLastDepartmentStore2 and Rappaportv. Nichols,' abandoned
the traditional nonliability approach and paved the way for other courts to do
the same, ushering in a new era of liquor liability.
Waynickinvolved one death and several injuries resulting from a twocar collision in Michigan.24 The driver at fault and his companion became

15. Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (11.
1889); Seibel v. Leach, 288 N.W. 774, 774
(Wis. 1939).
16. See Flecknerv. Dionne, 210 P.2d 530,534 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); State ex rel.
Joyce v. Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. Ct. App. 1951); Seibel, 288 N.W. at 775; Shelli Inmon,
Comment, Tomlinsonv. Love's CountryStores, Inc.: WhatDidthe CourtReallyDo?,19OKLA.
Crry U. L. REV.533, 534-35 (1994).
17. See Cowman v. Hansen, 92 N.W.2d 682, 686-87 (Iowa 1958).
18. See Julius F. Lang, Jr. & John J. McGrath, Comment, ThirdParty Liabilityfor
Drunken Driving: When "Onefor the Road" Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV.
1119, 1124 n.21 (1984). But see William Hurst, The Dram Shop: Closing Pandora'sBox, 22
IND.L. REV. 487, 488 n.13 (1988) (concluding that it is unclear whether Wisconsin or Indiana
enacted the first dram shop legislation); Richard B. Ogilvie, History andAppraisalof theIllinois
Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, 176 (1958) (asserting that Maine enacted the first dram
shop act in 1851).
19. See Lang & McGrath, supra note 18, at 1124.
20. Id. at 1125 &n.28.
21. See, e.g., Schelin v. Goldberg, 146 A.2d 648, 652-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958); see
also Sipes, supra note 14, at 6 (commenting that courts began to review the no-liability rules).
22. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
23. 156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959).
24. See Waynick, 269 F.2d at 323.
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intoxicated while in Illinois and evidently drank more liquor while in that
condition at three different establishments before traveling across the state line
and colliding with the plaintiffs' car.' Interestingly, both Michigan and Illinois
had dram shop laws, but the court found that Michigan's statute probably did
not apply because the liquor was sold in Illinois and that Illinois's statute did
not apply because it had previously been held not to apply extraterritorially.26
The court based its decision on Michigan's common law and concluded that the
defendants' unlawful sales of liquor to the driver proximately caused the
plaintiffs' injuries.27 However, in its discussion of duty, the court maintained
that the plaintiffs were "entitled to the protection given by § 131 ofthe Illinois
Act., 28 This strange holding was likely attributable, in part, to the unusual,
interstate fact situation, but it also seemingly reflected the court's desire to find
for the plaintiffs on moral grounds. The court described the accident as
"appalling"" and expressed concern that the plaintiffs' claim not be dismissed
hastily because of a "vacuum" in the law.30
Rappaportinvolved another fatal car crash, this one caused by a minor
who had been served, allegedly while noticeably intoxicated, at four different
bars in Newark, New Jersey. 3' New Jersey had repealed its civil-damage law
in 1934, but the court stated that "[t]he repealer left unimpaired the
fundamental negligence principles which admittedly prevail inNew Jersey and
upon which the plaintiff grounds his common law claim." 3 2 The Rappaport

court reviewed and criticized earlier decisions which held that furnishing
alcohol to an intoxicated person did not proximately cause later injuries by that
person or that those injuries were not foreseeable.33 The court labeled as
"unconvincing" the reasoning in Cowman v. Hansen,34 in which the Iowa
Supreme Court held that it was "not at all clear that [an intoxicated person] will
naturally assault someone, drive a car and injure or kill another, or do some
other tortious act."35
Ultimately, the Rappaport court decided that a tortfeasor should
generally answer for "injuries which result in the ordinary course of events
from his negligence.., if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing about the injuries."3 6 The court further stated that intervening causes
"which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk [of drinking]

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 324-25.
See Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1959).
Id. at 8.
See id. at 4-5.
92 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1958); see Rappaport,156A.2d at 5.
Cowman, 92 N.W.2d at 687.
Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 9.
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would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability" and that questions of proximate and
intervening cause ordinarily are factual determinations for the jury.37 The court
voted unanimously to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants.3"
These decisions and others they spawned eventually prompted
legislators to once again examine the issue of tavern liability, and in the late
1970s, states began passing new dram shop acts that either permitted or
restricted civil actions. 39 By 1987, a civil cause of action existed in forty-one
states.' Nineteen of those states had legislatively imposed liability for taverns,
indicating that tavern liability was judicially created in a majority of those
jurisdictions.4 ' In the absence of a specific statutory provision providing for
civil liability, courts have derived this liability either from common-law
principles ofnegligence or, as in South Carolina, by implying a cause of action
from violation of a penal or liquor-control statute that did not specifically
provide for civil liability.42
D.

The Distinction Between First-party and Third-party
Plaintiffs

A distinction between first-party and third-party plaintiffs first arose
in cases where courts were called upon to interpret pre-Prohibition dram shop
statutes, long before the demise of the common-law rule of nonliability. For
example, inMalonev. Lambrecht 3 the Michigan Supreme Court held that "one
who is active in bringing about the intoxication may not recover for injuries
resulting therefrom." Michigan has uniformly held that the civil-damage
provisions in its statute are "for the benefit and protection of innocent parties
only."' In Noonan v. Galick" a Connecticut court recognized the same
distinction:
Had [the state legislature] desired to extend
this remedy, unknown to the common law,
to the intoxicated person himself, it would
have done so in this statute. It is not hard to
see why the legislature has not so provided

37. Id.
38. Id. at 10-11.
39. See Sipes, supra note 14, at 4.
40. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. 1987).
41. Id.; see also Apter, supra note 14, at 281 n.22 (stating that 19jurisdictions had
legislatively enacted dram shop liability by 1984).
42. See Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 168, 328 S.E.2d 351,354 (1985).
43. 8 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1943).
44. Id. at911.
45. Id.
46. 112 A.2d 892 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955).
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if one contemplates the vast number of
claims which would be urged by drunks if
they were entitled to recover for every
expense or injury that is the natural
concomitant of intoxication.'
However, despite these holdings and others like them, some courts, in the wake
of Waynick and Rappaport,effectively removed the distinction between firstparty and third-party plaintiffs." These courts apparently viewed the demise of
the common-law rule oftavern nonliability as meaning that all injuries resulting
from the negligent serving of alcohol to an intoxicated person could be
remedied by an action against the serving tavern, regardless of whether a third
party or the intoxicated patron suffered those injuries.
Injurisdictions that permitted a first-party cause of action, defendants
generally argued that the plaintiff's contributory negligence should have barred
recovery.49 This argument has a long history ° and was an attractive strategy for
defendants, for if successfully asserted, it completely barred the plaintiff's
recovery. Some courts surmounted this obstacle by finding that the duty of a
tavern owner to an intoxicated patron attached despite the patron's selfdamaging actions. For example, one court stated:
The duty would be rendered meaningless to
a large extent ifa tavern keeper could avoid
responsibility by claiming that it was the
person's own fault if he drank too much. It
is obvious that in the ordinary sense it is
one's own fault if one gets drunk, but the
postulation of the tavern owner's duty in
such a situation assumes implicitly that
there has been such fault on the part of the
imposes the
drinker and nevertheless
5
protective duty. '

47. Id. at 894.
48. See Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1961); Ramsey v. Anctil, 211
A.2d 900, 901 (N.H. 1965); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 202 A.2d 208,209-210 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1964); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 873, 875-76 (Pa. 1965).
49. In this author's view, this argument gets at the very heart of the debate
surrounding first-party tavern liability cases. Though comparative negligence has now absorbed
contributory negligence in nearly alljurisdictions, virtually eliminating contributory negligence
as a total bar to recovery, the argument that the plaintiff in every case is the party more
responsible than anyone else for his own injuries due to alcohol consumption is the general
principle relied upon by most courts which have eliminated first-party causes of action.
50. See, e.g., Bissell v. Starzinger, 83 N.W. 1065, 1066 (Iowa 1900).
51. Soronen, 202 A.2d at 210.
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In jurisdictions where civil liability was based on the violation of a
statute, courts could find support for disallowing the contributory negligence
defense in the Restatement of Torts, whichprovided the following general rule:
If the defendant's negligence
consists in the violation of a statute enacted
to protect a class of persons from their
inability to exercise self-protective care, a
member of such class is not barred by his
contributory negligence from recovery for
bodily harm caused by the violation of such
statute. 2
In Majors v. BrodheadHotel53 the defendant apparently did not assert
contributory negligence, but the court, while affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff, stated that defendants in tavern liability cases would not be foreclosed
"from proving that the plaintiff was so intoxicated when defendant illegally
served him that the accident would have occurred even if defendant had not
illegally served him."54 Together with Galvin v. Jennings," Soronen v. Olde
Milfordnn,56 andRamsey v. Anctil,57 Majorsmarked the beginning of the most
prosperous era for first-party plaintiffs in tavern liability cases.
Beginning with California in the late 1970s, state legislatures began to
abrogate decisions allowing first parties to recover.58 In other states, courts
interpreted liquor control statutes as not providing causes of action in favor of
intoxicated patrons for their own injuries.59 In still other states, courts limited
the holdings of earlier decisions, disallowing first-party actions while
preserving third-party actions." This trend reached the point where, in 1987,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii could accurately state: "[T]he majority of
jurisdictions that have passed on this issue . . . emphatically reject the

52. RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 483 (1934);see Soronen, 202 A.2d at 211; Galvin, 289
F.2d at 19.
53. 205 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1965).

54. Id. at 878.
55. 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961).
56. 202 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964).
57. 211 A.2d 900 (N.H. 1965).
58. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1998); Mo.ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 1988);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 35-11-1 (Michie 1992).
59. See, e.g., Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 So. 2d 120, 123-24 (Ala. 1980);
Allen v. County ofWestchester, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772,775 (App. Div. 1985); Smith v. 10th Inning,
Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298-99 (Ohio 1990); Sager v. McClenden, 672 P.2d 697, 701 (Or.
1983).
60. See, e.g., Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 559 (Del. 1981) (limiting Taylor v.
Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978)); Bertelmann v. Taas Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 933
(Haw. 1987) (limiting Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980)); White v. HA, Inc., 782
P.2d 1125, 1132 (Wyo. 1989) (limiting McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983)).
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contention that intoxicated liquor consumers can seek recovery from the bar or
tavern which sold them alcohol. ' 61 Under Christiansenv. Campbell,62 South
Carolina was not a member of that majority. It would retain the minority rule
recognizing first-party causes of action until the supreme court decided Tobias
in August of 1998.
Ill.

HISTORY OF TAVERN LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

Statutory History

The first South Carolina statute which specifically prohibited tavern
owners and their employees from serving alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
persons was enacted by the General Assembly in 1874.63 The statute provided
that a violation would be a misdemeanor and prescribed penalties of a fine and
jail time. Interestingly, the statute also provided for civil liability, though only
in a narrow set of circumstances. A family member or guardian of any "known
intemperate person" could provide written notice to a tavern or liquor store
owner of that individual's intemperance, and upon receipt of this notice, the
owner and his employees were forbidden from serving alcohol to the
intemperate person.' If, within three months of the notice, a person on notice
served the intemperate individual and injury to person or property "occur[red]
in consequence of such furnishing," the person or persons responsible for
serving the alcohol to the intemperate person could be held severally liable.65
In these cases, recovery could be had by "any one aggrieved," including a wife
in her own name if she had provided the notice, "by an action instituted in any
Court of this State having jurisdiction of civil actions. ''es
In 1893 the South Carolina General Assembly signaled the beginning
of an era of strict state regulation and control of the sale and possession of
alcoholic beverages by enacting a law which eliminated all sales except those

61. Bertelmann, 735 P.2d at 933.
62. 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985).
63. Act of Mar. 19, 1874, No. 646, 1874 S.C. Acts 797. This Act was first codified
with the adoption by the General Assembly of the General Statutes in 1882. S.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 1738 (1882). If there existed any specific prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages
to an intoxicated person in South Carolina prior to 1874, it would have arisen by direct
application of English law. This may well have been possible, as Act No. 203, enacted by the
colonial General Assembly in 1703, provided that "for the better prevention, suppression and
punishment of such vices as are commonly practised in... publick houses," law enforcement
officials are empowered to execute "all laws, both statute and common, of the Kingdom of
England, which have been provided and used and are now in force for or concerning the abuses
and disorders of taverns, alehouses and victualling houses, and retailing any sort of strong
liquors, whatsoever .....
Act of May 6, 1703, 1703 Act No. 203, reprintedin 2 THE STATUTEs
AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 198 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1837).

64. 1874 S.C. Acts 797.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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by state-licensed dispensaries to individuals for personal or family
consumption.' This law effectively closed private liquor retailers and taverns
(or at least drove them underground) and ended legal, on-premises
consumption of alcohol. Complete prohibition of the sale of alcoholic
beverages followed in 1909,6" ten years before prohibition became federal law
with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.69
Concurrent with the repeal of federal prohibition, 0 the General
Assembly lifted state prohibition, first in 1933 for low-alcohol malt beverages72
and wines, 7' then in 1935 for all brewed, fermented, and spiritous liquors.
Private retailing was again permitted, but on-premises consumption remained
specifically banned.73 Section 10 of the 1935 Act resuscitated the language
from the 1874 statute forbidding sales to intoxicated persons.74 The statute
which eventually wouldbecome section 61-9-410 ofthe Code (now section 614-580), applying only to sales of beer and wine, was enacted in 1942."s Onpremises consumption of alcoholic beverages was legalized in 1967,76 and
section 61-5-30 of the Code (now section 61-6-2220), forbidding sales of
distilled liquor to intoxicated persons, was enacted in 1972. 77
B.

CaseLaw History

Despite their relatively long existence, none of these statutes
prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicatedpersons was addressed
in any reported case until 1985, when Christiansenv. Campbell78 became the
first case in which a South Carolina appellate court ruled on whether a tavern
owner's violation of the penal law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages
to intoxicated persons should give rise to a civil cause of action against the
serving tavern. The plaintiff, Douglas Christiansen, had drunk a number of
beers at Rosie's Hideaway, abar in Charleston County owned by the defendant
Rosaleen Forcier, who had continued to serve Christiansen after he became

67. Act of Dec. 23, 1893, No. 313, 1893 S.C. Acts 430, repealed by Act of Mar. 2,
1909, No. 42, 1909 S.C. Acts 60.
68. 1909 S.C. Acts 60.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
71. Act of Apr. 14, 1933, No. 228, 1933 S.C. Acts 287, repealedby Act of June 20,
1967, No. 398, 1967 S.C. Acts 571.
72. Act of May 14, 1935, No. 232, 1935 S.C. Acts 325, repealed by 1967 S.C. Acts
571.
73. 1935 S.C. Acts at 332.
74. Id.
75. Act of Mar. 17, 1942, No. 748, 1942 S.C. Acts 1739.
76. 1967 S.C. Acts 571.
77. Act of Mar. 16, 1972, No. 1063, 1972 S.C. Acts 2213.
78. 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss4/16

10

O'Connor: Tort Law

1999]

TORT LAW

1105

intoxicated.79 When he left the bar, Christiansen stepped into the street and was
hit by the defendant Campbell, who did not appeal. In his claim against Forcier,
Christiansen alleged that Forcier's negligence in serving himbeer while he was
intoxicated, in violation of section 61-9-410, proximately caused his injuries."
The court stated that in determining whether civil liability should arise
from a penal statute, "we look to see whether the statute is one designed to
promote public safety, the complaining party is a member of the class the
statute is intended to protect, and the party allegedly at fault is a person upon
whom the statute imposes specific duties.""1 The court decided that "[o]ne
reason the statute exists is to protect intoxicated persons from their own
incompetence and helplessness. The statute represents the legislature's
judgment that an intoxicated person is a menace to himself."82 The court cited
a Wyoming case and an overruled Arizona case as supporting this
propositionY It also cited cases from several states as holding that a penal
statute like section 61-9-410 can give rise to a civil cause of action." The court
concluded that section 61-9-410 created a specific statutory duty for tavern
owners not to serve intoxicated persons.s
The court also found support for its position in South Carolina case
law. It cited Harrisonv. Berkley,86 an 1847 case in which a shopkeeper sold
whiskey to a slave in violation of a statute prohibiting such sales. The slave
died of exposure after drinking the whiskey, and the slave's owner sued the
shopkeeper for damages." The shopkeeper argued that the sale ofthe liquor did
not proximately cause the slave's death, but the court affirmed a jury verdict
for the plaintiff.88 It held that the shopkeeper could have foreseen the slave's
death as a natural consequence of the sale, and thus the question was properly
submitted to the jury.89 In Christiansenthe court of appeals found the two cases
to be similar because they both involved the question of whether ajury should
decide if the plaintiff's injury was a natural and probable result of the unlawful
sale. 90

79. Id. at 166, 328 S.E.2d at 353.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 167-68, 328 S.E.2d at 354.
82. Id. at 168, 328 S.E.2d at 354 (citation omitted).
83. Id. (citing Lewis v. Wolf, 596 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), overruled by
Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.
1983)).
84. Id. at 168-69, 328 S.E.2d at 354-55.
85. Id. at 168, 328 S.E.2d at 354.
86. 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 525 (1847); see Christiansen,285 S.C. at 169,328 S.E.2d at
355.
87. Harrison,32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) at 525-26.
88. Id. at 549, 551.
89. See id. at 550-51.
90. See Christiansen,285 S.C. at 169, 328 S.E.2d at 355. The causation analysis set
forth by the court of appeals in Christiansen was again employed by the same court the
following year in Ballou v. Sigma Nu GeneralFraternity,291 S.C. 140, 148, 352 S.E.2d 488,
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Later in 1985 the supreme court gave notice that a private right of
action, such as the one provided by the court of appeals in Christiansen,did not
necessarily attach to every statute designed to protect the public. In Whitworth
v. FastFareMarkets, Inc.9" two minors and their mother sued a store whose
employees had repeatedly sold cigarettes to the minors in violation of penal
statutes prohibiting such sales.92 The plaintiffs alleged that the minors had
become addicted to tobacco and, as a result, had damaged their mother's home,
stolen money from her, and exhibited habitually disobedient behavior when
denied cigarettes.93 The trial court granted summary judgment, and the supreme
court affirmed, holding that the penal statutes at issue were "primarily for the
protection of the public and not for the protection of private rights."'94 In
support of its position, the court quoted American Jurisprudence:9 "[T]he
general rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability,
but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an
entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability."96
In the 1986 case of Garrenv. Cummings &McCrady,Inc.,' the court
of appeals refused to create liability for social hosts.98 The plaintiff sought to
recover for personal injuries he suffered in a car accident caused by an
intoxicated man who had driven across the center line. The man had become
intoxicated at a party given by the defendant, Cummings & McCrady, Inc.99
The suit was grounded in common-law negligence because no South Carolina
statute provided for criminal penalties or civil liability for social hosts.' In
finding no liability, the court of appeals noted that its holding accorded with the

495 (Ct. App. 1986).
91. 289 S.C. 418, 338 S.E.2d 155 (1985).
92. Id. at 419-20, 338 S.E.2d at 155. Section 16-17-500 of the Code specifically
prohibits sales oftobacco products minors, while section 16-17-490 makes it unlawful to cause
or to encourage a minor to violate any law. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17490, -500 (Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1998).
93. Whitworth, 289 S.C. at 419-20, 338 S.E.2d at 155.
94. Id. at 421, 338 S.E.2d at 156.
95. Id. at 420, 338 S.E.2d at 156.
96. 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 432 (1974). Notably, had the court of appeals employed
this reasoning in Christiansen,it could not have reached the result it did. Evidently the court
believed some reason existed why the statutes violated in Whitworth were subject to this "general
rule" of construction, while the statutes violated in Christiansen,which also did not "purport to
establish civil liability," were not.
97. 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986).
98. Id. at 350-51, 345 S.E.2d at 510; see also Jon R. Erickson & Donna Harper
Hamilton, Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers, and SocialHosts for Torts
of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (1983) (stating that dram shop acts
are generally not applied to gratuitous providers of alcohol, including employers). The term
"social host" refers to a gratuitous provider of alcohol who "receives no pecuniary gain for
providing alcoholic beverages to his guest and will have to personally absorb the cost of
insurance or other security." Lowe v. Rubin, 424 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
99. Garren, 289 S.C. at 349, 345 S.E.2d at 509.
100. See id. at 349, 351, 345 S.E.2d at 509-10.
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"weight of authority" and the "general common law view": ,01
"The proper
remedy for a third party injured as a result of the guest's intoxication is to sue
the guest who injured him. If an additional remedy is to be provided against the
host, it should be done by the legislature, not the courts .... " 0 2 The court
distinguished Christiansenin three ways: First, in Garren, the alcohol had
been provided gratuitously rather than sold; second, the provider was a social
host rather than a commercial licensee; and third, no statutory violation had
occurred." 3
The court of appeals made important, clarifying additions to the body
of South Carolina case law addressing duty and foreseeability, respectively,
with its decisions in Rayfield v. South CarolinaDepartmentof Corrections"'
in 1988, and Crolley v. Hutchins"°5 in 1989. Though Rayfield did not involve
alcoholic beverages, the case is relevant in analyzing tavern liability cases
because of its treatment of the special duty of care to others which a statute can,
but does not always, create. The case is also important because the supreme
court in Tobiasmust necessarily have consideredRayfield's two-part test when
it abolished the first-party cause of action in tavern liability cases. The Rayfield
court set forth this two-part test to determine whether a statute creates a duty
of care by a defendant. In order to establish such a duty, the plaintiff must
show:
(1) that the essential purpose of the statute
is to protect from the kind of harm the
plaintiff has suffered; and (2) that [the
plaintiff] is a member of the class of
persons the statute is intended to protect.
Ifthe plaintiffmakes this showing,
he has proven the first element of a claim
for negligence: viz., that the defendant
owes him a duty of care. If he then shows
that the defendant violated the statute, he
has proven the second element of a cause of
action: viz., that the defendant, by act or
omission, failed to exercise due care. This
constitutes proof of negligence per se.0 6
In Crolley,another case involving a statutory violation, the court stated that no
liability existswhere the injury complained of is not reasonably foreseeable,

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 349-50, 345 S.E.2d at 509-10.
Id. at 350, 345 S.E.2d at 510.
See id. at 351,345 S.E.2d at 510.
297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1988).
300 S.C. 355, 387 S.E.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1989).
Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 103, 374 S.E.2d at 914-15.
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and the law does not require one to foresee unpredictable events or those
"whichwould notbe expected to happen as a natural and probable consequence
of the defendant's negligent act. Foreseeability is to be judged from the
perspective of the defendant at the time of the negligent act, not after the injury
has occurred."' 1 7 Like Rayfield, Crolley likely played arole in the development
of South Carolina tavern liability jurisprudence because the supreme court
undoubtedly considered the foreseeability analysis in Crolley, and that of the
cases upon which that decision rested, in deciding Tobias.10
At any rate, though Christiansenestablished a first-party cause of
action in tavern liability cases, the opinion did not specifically address whether
a third-party cause of action would lie against the violator. However, the
Christiansencourt hinted how it would decide that issue with the following
language: "Section 61-9-410 clearly promotes public safety.... Indeed, a
purpose in prohibiting a vendor from selling beer to one who is already
intoxicated is to prevent the person from becoming even more intoxicated so
that he is not a greaterrisk when he leaves the bar.""' By pointing to the
statute's public safety function, and by including language that implies concern
about risk to society in general rather than only risk to the intoxicated patron
himself," 0 the Christiansencourt foreshadowed its treatment of third-party
tavern liability cases.
In 1990, the court of appeals's decision inJamison v. Pantry,Inc."'
indicated that a third-party cause of action arising from a violation of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was available, though the existence of that
cause of action was not an issue in the case." 2 In fact, the parties apparently
assumed the cause of action's existence as is evident from the defendant's
failure to assert the nonexistence of a third-party cause of action as a defense
at trial." 3 Neither party addressed the issue on appeal. The statutory violation
involved in Jamison was the sale of beer to a minor."4
107. 300 S.C. at 357, 387 S.E.2d at 717 (citation omitted).
108. One of the most difficult obstacles for a court that chooses to abolish first-party
claims against tavern owners while maintaining a cause of action in favor of third parties is the
argument that an injury to an intoxicated patron isjust as foreseeable as an injury to a third party.
Arguably, an injury to the first party, the intoxicated patron, is even more likely and foreseeable
because the intoxicated patron could be hurt two ways-in a one-vehicle crash or by crashing
into a second vehicle.
109. Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 168, 328 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App.
1985) (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. 301 S.C. 443, 392 S.E.2d 474 (Ct. App. 1990).
112. Id. at 448 n.6, 392 S.E.2d at 477 n.6.
113. Id.
114. As noted above, because Tobias declined to address the issue ofwhether a cause
of action exists for first-party minors, that issue is not addressed at length in this Comment.
However, two other cases decided afterJamison and involving minors, Whitlaw v. KrogerCo.,
306 S.C. 51, 410 S.E.2d 251 (1991), and Norton v. Opening Break, Inc., 313 S.C. 508, 443
S.E.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1994), aft'd, 319 S.C. 469,462 S.E.2d 361 (1995), provide insight as to
whether the supreme court will create a cause of action in favor of first-party minors based on
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Daley v. Ward,115 decided in 1990, presented the court ofappeals with
an opportunity to address yet another critical issue in the tavern liability puzzle:
a bartender's or server's responsibility to know when a patron is intoxicated
and must be refused service. On June 22, 1986, John William Ward, III spent
four or five hours drinking nine twelve-ounce cans ofbeer at The Windjammer,
a bar on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina. Fifteen or
twenty minutes after leaving the bar, Ward rear-ended a car driven by the
plaintiff Mary C. Daley. "6 Testimony of police officers and a police videotape
indicated that Ward was intoxicated at the time of the crash, and Ward testified
that he did not recall drinking anywhere other than The Windjammer that
evening. The two bartenders on duty both testified that they did not remember
Ward, that the bar's policy was not to serve anyone who appeared intoxicated,
that they would have refused to serve anyone in Ward's condition as revealed
by the police videotape, and that they did not knowingly serve any intoxicated
person that day."1 7
Daley sued Ward and The Windjammer. The jury returned a verdict
finding The Windjammer not liable." 8 In appealing that verdict, Daley assigned
error to the trial judge's refusal to read the jury her requested instruction, taken
from a North Carolina case, stating that a plaintiff must show that the
"Defendant's patron was intoxicated" and that the Defendant "knew or should
have known the patron was in an intoxicated condition at the time he or she was

violations of sections 61-4-90, 61-4-580(1), or 61-6-4070 of the Code. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 61-4-90, -4-580(1), -6-4070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the sale or transfer of
alcoholic beverages to a minor).
Significantly, while deciding that the class intended for protection under the statutes
did not necessarily include all persons to whom the minor might in turn give or sell the alcohol,
the Whitlaw court did state that "[t]he statutes in this case are designed to prevent harm to the
minor who purchased the alcohol and to members of the public harmed by the minor's
consumption of that alcohol." Whitlaw, 306 S.C. at 54-55, 410 S.E.2d at 253 (emphasis added).
In light of this language, the supreme court's statement in Tobias that "[w]e leave for another
day the issue whether we will recognize a first party actionbroughtby a minor," Tobias v. Sports
Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90,93,504 S.E.2d 318,320 (1998), can be interpreted two ways: Either this
language in Tobias undermines the persuasiveness of the dictum in Whitlaw while forecasting
full consideration of this issue upon the presentation of an appropriate case; or the Whitlaw
dictum indicates that the court has already decided that first-party minors are among those
intended to be protected, and the Tobias language simply indicates that the court is waiting for
a case on point in order to clarify the law.
The court repeated the Whitlaw dictum in Norton: "[A] rule forbidding a licensee...
to facilitate consumption of alcohol by a minor is designed to protect both the minor who
consumes the alcohol and those members of the public likely to be harmed by the minor's
consumption of that alcohol." Norton, 313 S.C. at 512, 443 S.E.2d at 408-09. Whitlaw and
Norton both quoted the Rayfield two-part test for determining when a duty is created by a statute.
See Whitlaw, 306 S.C. at 53, 410 S.E.2d at 252; Norton, 313 S.C. at 511,443 S.E.2d at 408.
115. 303 S.C. 81, 399 S.E.2d 13 (CL App. 1990).
116. Id. at 83, 399 S.E.2d at 14.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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served.""' 9 The trial judge instead instructed the jury by reading section 61-9410(2)120 of the Code verbatim.' 2 ' The court of appeals found the instruction to
be proper because Daley had cited no controlling authority for a charge
containing the language "knew or should have known."' "
Daley posited on appeal that she was entitled to the requested charge
based on the 1943 case ofFeldmanv. South CarolinaTax Commission.12 The
statute involved inFeldmanwas similarto section 61-9-410 and also contained
the term "knowingly."' 24 Though it ruled against Daley on this point, the court
acknowledged that she "may have been entitled to a charge based on Feldman"
had she requested it at trial."z The court quoted the supreme court's
construction of the term in Feldman and concluded that Feldman provided
authority for an instruction "which injects a 'reasonable person' standard into
the definition of 'knowingly'...., Nonetheless, the court ofappeals reversed
the circuit court on another ground. During its deliberations, the jury sent a
written question to the trial judge: "If as a jury we feel that the bartenders at
the Windjammer did not knowingly sell Mr. Ward alcoholic beverages when
he was intoxicated, do we need to consider the bartenders' negligence?"' 27 The
trial judge answered the jury with the following instruction: "If you were to
find that the Defendants did not knowingly sell alcoholic beverages to a person
who was intoxicated, then by so finding you will have found that there was no
legal duty that was breached. Therefore, there was no negligence. ,,121 The court
of appeals held that this response "took from the province of the jury the issue
of whether the bartenders negligently served alcoholic beverages to a person
who, by his appearance or otherwise, would lead a prudent man to believe that

119. Id. at 85, 399 S.E.2d at 15 (emphasis added).
120. S.C. CODEANN. § 61-9-410(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (current version at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 61-4-580 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998)).
121. Daley, 303 S.C. at 85, 399 S.E.2d at 15.
122. Id.
123. 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
124. See id. at 53, 26 S.E.2d at 24. The statute provided that "[n]o retail dealer shall
knowingly sell, offer for sale, barter, or exchange any alcoholic liquors to any person when
drunk or intoxicated, nor to a minor, nor to any insane person, and upon violation of any ofthese
provisions, upon conviction, shall suffer the penalties hereinafter provided." Id.
125. Daley, 303 S.C. at 86, 399 S.E.2d at 15.
126. Id. In Feldman the supreme court held:
Within the meaning of the term "knowingly," as
used in this statute, if the clerk knew that the
[purchaser] was a minor or had such information,
from his appearance or otherwise, as would lead a
prudent man to believe that he was a minor, and if
followed by inquiry must bring knowledge of that
fact home to him, then the sale was made knowingly.
Feldman, 203 S.C. at 56, 26 S.E.2d at 25; see Daley, 303 S.C. at 86, 399 S.E.2d at 15.

127. Daley, 303 S.C. at 86,399 S.E.2d at 16.
128. Id.
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person was intoxicated.""I
Daley's curious result is at apparent odds with the plain meaning of
section 61-9-410(2) and is strangely inconsistent with the supreme court's prior
construction of "knowingly." The trial judge's answer did not take the issue of
the bartenders' negligence from the jury. The jury's written question indicated
that it had in fact focused squarely on that very issue. That issue was whether
the bartenders knowingly served an intoxicated person. Even without the
benefit of an illuminating instruction, as might have been permitted under
Feldman, the jury still managed to discern the crux of the matter based on the
clear language of section 61-9-410(2). Even more importantly, the content of
the jury's question implied that the jurors had already arrived at a consensus on
that question of fact, apparently having determined that the bartenders had not
knowingly served an intoxicated person. Consequently, the court of appeals
should have held the trial judge's answer to be either a correct statement of the
law or, at worst, harmless error.
A smaller but nonetheless significant issue in Daley was whether a
third-party cause of action arises under the holding of Christiansen.The court
of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Ward's and The Windjammer's
motions for directed verdict that Christiansenallowed only first-party, and not
third-party, causes of action. 30 CitingJamison,the court held that "the purpose
of the statute is to protect not only the individual served in violation of the
statute, but also the public at large, from the possible adverse consequences."''
Against the foregoing backdrop of tavern liability jurisprudence, the
court of appeals heard arguments in Tobias.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF TOBIAS V SPORTS CLUB, INC.

A.

The Court ofAppeals's Opinion

The court of appeals's decision in Tobias was noteworthy because,
though it did not overrule Christiansen,it critically weakened the first-party
cause of action by allowing the defendant to assert the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.'32 The parties' arguments
in the court of appeals provide a good starting point for a policy analysis of the
court's position.
As noted above, Christiansenpresented the court of appeals with an
issue of first impression as to whether a civil cause of action arises from a
violation of a statute controlling alcoholic beverages. Consequently, Forcier,
the defendant in Christiansen,logically argued on appeal that the pleadings

129. Id. at 87, 399 S.E.2d at 16.
130. See id. at 84, 399 S.E.2d at 14-15.
131. Id. at 84, 399 S.E.2d at 15.
132. See Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 323 S.C. 345, 356, 474 S.E.2d 450, 456 (Ct.
App. 1996), affd as modified, 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998).
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failed to state a claim.'33 In Tobias the defendants were no doubt aware that
Daley and other cases had reiterated Christiansen'sholding that the legislature
intended a first-party cause of action for intoxicated patrons. 3 4 In addition,
Tobias presented facts that were no stronger than those presented in Daley,
which had resulted in a reversal of a defense verdict. 3 ' Given these factors, the
defendants understandably recognized the need for a new theory. The
defendants' strategy was not to dispute only the fact that anyone at Mallard's
knowingly served Tobias while intoxicated (the approach of the Daley
defendants), but also to emphasize the prominent role Tobias played in creating
his own misfortune.'36 In so doing, the defendants managed to create a first
impression case in that it was the first time a South Carolina appellate court had
been called upon to decide whether a defendant in a tavern liability case could
assert the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk against an intoxicated patron."'
In allowing the defenses, the court of appeals noted that "foreclosing
a tavern owner from showing that its breach of duty did not contribute to the
plaintiff's injuries or that the plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of the
defendant 'would clearly be contrary to traditional tort principles."3

3

The

court also recognized that it would be "difficult to conceive of a fact situation
more compelling on the issue of contributory negligence.' 31 9 In his concurring

opinion, Judge Goolsby argued that by allowing these affirmative defenses, the
court effectively abrogated the legislative intent embodied in the statutes at
issue. 4 The majority responded to this argument by pointing out that the
statutes' penal effect remained and by noting that its decision facilitated "the
legislative purpose of deterring drunk driving and punishing tavern owners who
serve obviously intoxicated persons... without absolving the inebriate of
responsibility for his actions.'' The court stated that two of the three
jurisdictions cited by the concurrence as not permitting the defense of
contributory negligence had since allowed proof of the plaintiff's fault under

133. Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 166-67, 328 S.E.2d 351,353 (Ct. App.
1985).
134. Despite these confirmations, none of these three cases involved a first-party
cause of action, so the statements were dicta. In addition, Whitlaw and Norton involved
intoxicated minors rather than intoxicated adults. See supra note 114.
135. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
136. See Brief for Respondent at 12-13.
137. See Tobias, 323 S.C. at 346-47,474 S.E.2d at 450-51.
138. Id. at 354, 474 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1259
(Colo. 1989)). The reference to the tavern owner not contributing to the plaintiff's injuries is
reminiscent of the position sanctioned by the court in Majors v. BrodheadHotel,205 A.2d 873,
878 (Pa. 1965), that defendants should be permitted to prove that "the plaintiff was so
intoxicatedwhen [the] defendantillegally served him thatthe accidentwouldhave occurred even
if the defendant had not illegally served him." Id.
139. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 354, 474 S.E.2d at 455.
140. See id. at 359, 474 S.E.2d at 457 (Goolsby, J., concurring).
141. Id at 355, 474 S.E.2d at 455.
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a comparative negligence regime and also noted that a majority ofjurisdictions
that had considered the issue "limit the inebriated patron's ability to sue the
4
tavern owner for the consequences of the patron's voluntary intoxication."'

In the last paragraph ofits opinion, the court concisely summarized the
policy- and morality-based argument that had become a hallmark of opinions
eliminating first-party causes of action in tavern liability cases:
In our view, a rule which allows an
intoxicated individual to hold a tavern
owner liable without regard to his own
actions in continuing to consume alcohol
promotes irresponsibility and rewards drunk
driving. "Given a choice between a rule that
fosters individual responsibility and one
that forsakes personal accountability, we
opt for personal agency over dependency
and embrace individual autonomy over
paternalism.""14
Though the court of appeals in Tobias may apparently have departed
substantially from the policy position it had taken in Christiansen,no South
Carolina appellate court, at the time Christiansenwas decided, had considered
a tavern's liability since Harrisonv. Berkley'" in 1847. Thus, whether any
cause of action existed in favor of either a third party or an intoxicated patron
was unsettled. The position taken by the court in Christiansenwas consistent
with the holdings of other jurisdictions where third-party plaintiffs had
persuaded courts to abandon the common-law rule of nonliability. The
influence of these arguments over the Christiansencourt is evidenced by the
tavern liability cases the court cited-all were third-party cases. 45

142. Id at 355-56, 474 S.E.2d at 455-56.
143. Id. at 356, 474 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting Estate of Kelly v. Falin, 896 P.2d 1245,

1250 (Wash. 1995)).
144. 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 525, 551 (1847) (holding a shopkeeper liable to a slave
owner for having caused a slave's death by selling liquor to the slave in violation of a statute
prohibiting such sales).
145. See Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lewis v.
Wolf, 596 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), overruledby Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz.
1983); Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533
(Haw. 1980); Alegria v. Payonk, 619 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1980); Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d
584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983). The preceding
cases were all third-party cases, though some included dicta implying that the same remedy
might be available for first-party intoxicated patrons. However, the Christiansencourt did cite
to Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Liability ofPersonsFurnishingIntoxicatingLiquorfor Injury to
orDeath of Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil DamageActs, 98 A.L.R.3d 1230 (1980). See
Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 169, 328 S.E.2d 351, 355 (Ct. App. 1985). The
annotation features an extensive survey of first-party tavern liability cases.
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If South Carolina had recognized third-party causes of action at the
time of the Christiansenappeal, the court's analysis might have focused on the
distinction between first-party and third-party plaintiffs. Instead, the court of
appeals relied on Harrison,a factually dissimilar case in significant respects,
and primarily addressed the issue ofcausation, a key weakness in the commonlaw rule of nonliability. The court's citation of four third-party cases and no
first-party cases indicates that it likely focused on the arguments advocating an
end to the common-law rule of nonliability while apparently declining to
consider the important distinction between the two classes of plaintiffs. The
arguments addressing causation, foreseeability, and duty are compelling when
advanced in cases involving injuries to innocent third parties,'" but otherpolicy
concerns compete when the plaintiff is an intoxicated patron.'47
The court of appeals's opinion in Tobias does not discount the often
repeated arguments made in the context of advocating an end to the nonliability
rule. It simply reflects a view, held in a majority ofjurisdictions by then, that
allowing intoxicated patrons to shift the entire cost of their own injuries is
unwise as a policy matter. The court also undoubtedly recognized that, because
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are unavailable in cases
where the plaintiff is a third party, its decision did not affect the viability of
third-party actions. Thus, a significant deterrent against tavern owners and
employees serving intoxicated patrons remained, while at the same time, a

146. See Ontiveros, 667 P.2d at 207 ("The statistics . . . indicate a frightful
toll-25,000 deaths and 650,000 injuries each year in motor vehicle accidents in which alcohol
is a contributing cause."); Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 65 (Idaho 1969) (Prather, J.,
dissenting) ("I perceive no difference [between] the sale of further intoxicants to one already
drunk... [and] the sale of firearms to minors or incompetents .... ); Jardine v. Upper Darby
Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 198 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa. 1964) ("To serve an intoxicated person more
liquor is to light the fuse."); McClellan, 666 P.2d at 415 ("[The non-liability rule] places us all
at more peril, because there is no effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from selling liquor
to minors or to intoxicated persons .... Perhaps the threat of civil liability or increased
insurance premiums will serve to make liquor vendors more careful.").
147. As one court stated:
As a matter of public policy, we have premised the
duty of commercial vendors on the need to protect
innocent bystandersfrom intoxicated patrons, and on
the need to protect minors. These public policy
concerns are not present when intoxicated adults
injure themselves.
A rule that allows an intoxicated adult to hold a
commercial vendor liable fosters irresponsibility and
rewards drunk driving. Rather than deterring drunk
driving, excessive drinking, and the callow and
imprudent behavior of intoxicated adults, such a rule
would actually compensate patrons who drinkbeyond
obvious intoxication.
Estate ofKelly, 896 P.2d at 1249-50 (citations and footnote omitted).
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corresponding deterrent against patrons' abuse of alcohol was strengthened.148
B.

The Supreme Court's Opinion

As noted above, the court of appeals's opinion in Tobias effectively
overruled Christiansenby allowing contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk as affirmative defenses. But the supreme court removed all doubt as to
the status of first-party causes of action by explicitly overruling Christiansen:
The Court of Appeals ... held that another
of the statutory purposes was to protect the
intoxicated person from his own
incompetence and helplessness, and
therefore concluded the intoxicated patron
himself was entitled to bring a negligence
suit for a statutory violation. We disagree,
and now hold that public policy is not
served by allowing the intoxicated adult
patron to maintain a suit for injuries
which
49
result from his own conduct.1
However, though stating that it based its decision on "public policy," the court
offered little insight into that policy. The court neither provided any analysis
of the issues nor addressed adverse policy arguments. In the paragraph
following its overruling of Christiansen, the court offered only this brief
explanation:
Imposing liability on a tavern owner for
continuing to serve an intoxicated person
who later injures others serves public policy
by imposing upon the tavern owner a duty
to use judgment and discretion. We do not
believe that the owner will exercise this
judgment and discretion less prudently if he
risks a law suit only when the intoxicated

148. Lang and McGrath made the unsupported and somewhat speculative assertion
that by eliminating the intoxicated patron's cause of action, "the deterrent effect of a liability
statute is at least partially thwarted, since certain furnishers of alcohol may be willing to take the
chance that third parties will not be injured." Lang & McGrath, supra note 18, at 1185 n.335.
This statement typifies an often repeated but probably unrealistic perception of the bar and
restaurant business. It seems to envision a situation where tavern employees are tempted to
"risk" serving intoxicated patrons. This view fails to recognize the common-sense notion that
servers or bartenders typically have little or no monetary or other incentive to serve more drinks
to an intoxicated patron.
149. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 92, 504 S.E.2d 318, 319-20 (1998).
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person injures others. The decision to refuse
to serve alcoholic beverages, beer or wine
to an intoxicated patron will be unaffected
by our decision today. 0
The court further noted that it was following only the majority rule and that it
was leaving open the question of whether it would recognize a first-party action
brought by a minor.'

Though the court's authoritative-sounding statement about the effect
of its opinion on tavern owners' decisions might well be true, it is lamentably
conclusory. The court cited ten opinions from other jurisdictions which had
eliminated first-party causes of action, 5 2 and most contain a much more
thorough policy analysis. The brief nature ofthe court's opinion renders it less
credible and subjects it to criticism for its lack of substantive discussion
because, though the court presumably undertook a thorough review of the
many cases and commentaries addressing first-party causes of action, one
can only speculate as to the court's beliefs about the best policy arguments in
favor of eliminating first-party causes of action or the weaknesses it perceived
in the contrary arguments.
The supreme court's opinion may have reflected a view that reading
a first-party cause of action into a statute controlling the sale of alcohol
construed the statute too liberally. Courts in other jurisdictions, including some
cited by the supreme court in Tobias, pointed out that nothing prevents state
legislatures from specifically establishing a cause of action in favor of
intoxicated patrons ifthey so intend.5 4 By narrowing its reading ofsections 615-30 and 61-9-410 of the Code, perhaps the supreme court, without expressly
saying so, handed the ball to the South Carolina General Assembly. Its holding
in Tobiasmay mean that no first-party causes of action exist in tavern liability
cases absent legislative enactment.
The supreme court's opinion also indicates thatthe court was troubled,
as had been the court of appeals and courts in other jurisdictions, by the idea
of creating a rule which would apparently reward a party clearly undeserving
of any such reward. The problem is that every first-party tavern liability case

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
See id. at 91, 93, 504 S.E.2d at 319, 320.
See id. at 93, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
See THOMAs B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION
GATHERING IN THE ADvERSARY SYSTEM 131 (1978) ("[J]udges often study secondary authority
or opinions of other courts to find reasons for announcing a rule in the case at hand.")
154. See, e.g., Noonan v. Galick, 112 A.2d 892, 894 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) ("Had
(the legislature] desired to extend this remedy, unknown to the common law, to the intoxicated
person himself, it would have done so .... "); Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 556 (Del. 1981)
("[I]n our view, the General Assembly is in a far better position than this Court to gather the
empirical data and to make the fact finding necessary to determine what the public policy should
be as to a Dram Shop law, and the scope of any such law.").
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involves a plaintiffwho must necessarily stipulate to having beennegligent and
to having violated a penal law"'5 and, in order to recover damages, must allege
that the tavern owner also was negligent and also violated a penal law. In
contrast, the tavern owner need not stipulate to these transgressions and, in fact,
may have committed neither. The tavern owner's conduct is a question of fact,
and the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff. Even so, allowing this type of
blame-shifting seems counterproductive. 56 Such a rule also seems directly at
odds with general notions of personal responsibility. As the supreme court
stated in State v. Vaughn:. 7
[V]oluntary intoxication, where it has not
produced permanent insanity, is never an
excuse for or a defense to crime, regardless
ofwhether the intent involved be general or
specific. Reason requires that a man who
voluntarily renders himself intoxicated be
no less responsible for his acts while in such
condition. To grant immunity for crimes
committed while the perpetrator is in such
a voluntary state would not only mean that
many offenders would go unpunished but
would also transgress the principle of
personal accountability which is the
bedrock of all law. "The effect of
drunkenness on the mind and on men's
actions... is a fact known to everyone, and
it is as much the duty of men to abstain
from placing themselves in a condition from
which such danger to others is to be

155. Even if the plaintiffs were injured in some way other than by driving under the
influence, their public intoxication alone would likely violate section 16-17-530 of the Code,
which states: "Any person who shall (a) be found on any highway or at any public place or
public gathering in a grossly intoxicated condition... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
..... S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-530 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
156. As one court stated:
[P]ermitting the intoxicated patron a cause of action
in this context would simply send the wrong message
to all our citizens, because such a message would
essentially state that a patron who has purchased
alcoholic beverages from a permit holder may drink
such alcohol with unbridled, unfettered impunity and
with full knowledge that the permit holder will be
ultimately responsible for any harm caused by the
patron's intoxication.
Smith v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ohio 1990).
157. 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977).
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apprehended as it is to abstain from firing
into a crowd or doing any other act likely to
be attended with dangerous or fatal
consequences."

V.

158

RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FIRST-PARTY TAVERN
LIABILITY

The reasons most frequently advanced for expanding the liability of
taverns are that commercial vendors "(1) can purchase extensive liability
insurance to bear [the cost of injuries to patrons]; (2) can most equitably spread
the cost of insurance by increasing the prices of alcoholic beverages; (3) have
expertise injudging whether a [patron] is intoxicated; and (4) can most directly
control its patrons' consumption of alcoholic beverages."' 59
Like other arguments in favor of expanding tavern liability, the
enterprise liability or "deep pockets" argument is much more appealing in the
context of ending the common-law rule of nonliability in order to compensate
injuries to innocent third parties. Moreover, "commercial general-liability
insurance policies insuring business establishments which sell or distribute
alcoholic beverages as part or all of their business [often] contain a specific
exclusion from coverage for alcohol sold in violation of statutes regulating the
sale of alcoholic beverages to minors and intoxicated persons."' 60 Given that
such a statutory violation is a required element of an intoxicated patron's case,
a liability policy containing such an exception would not cover the serving
tavern. In contrast, the intoxicated patron's insurance policy presumably would
not exclude coverage for injuries resulting from the patron's own negligent
acts.
The argument that tavern employees are skilled at identifying patrons'
intoxication levels and are best positioned to prevent intoxicated patrons from
continuing to drink fails to recognize two basic realities. First, an intoxicated
patron who wishes to keep drinking has an incentive to hide his intoxication
from tavern employees, and experienced drinkers are often skilled at
concealing their intoxication.' Second, patrons, not tavern employees or
158. Id. at 125-26, 232 S.E.2d at 330-31 (quoting 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 66
(1961)) (alteration in original).
159. Suzette M. Nanovic, Note, Comparative Negligence and Dram Shop Laws:
Does Buckley v. Pirolo Sound Last Callfor Holding New Jersey Liquor Vendors Liablefor the
Torts of Intoxicated Persons?,62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 238, 252 (1987) (footnote omitted);
accordErickson & Hamilton, Comment, supra note 98, at 1015.
160. See 9 LEE R. Russ &THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 132:56
(1997).
161. "[T]he experienced, older drinker often has the ability to 'pull himself together'
when under observation and to hide the signs of his true condition." Commonwealth v. Brooks,
319 N.E.2d 901, 904 (Mass. 1974) (quoting RICHARD E. ERwIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING
CASES § 9.02 (3d ed. 1971); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 527 (1968) (stating at the
time that an estimated four million alcoholics existed in the United States and that a "very large
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anyone else, are best positioned to know how much they have had to drink and
when they are approaching or have reached intoxication.
At certain times in some establishments, a bartender or server may be
capable of watching particular patrons closely enough to know how much they
have consumed or notice outward signs of intoxication. Programs such as TAM
(Techniques in Alcohol Management) and TIPS (Training for Intervention
Procedures), which teach bar and restaurant employees how to spot and handle
intoxicated patrons, provide an invaluable public service. Participation in such
a program should be a prerequisite for licensing.' 62 But increasing the already
substantial burden on tavern owners to ensure that no one gets drunk at their
taverns,163 when a certain percentage of patrons will inevitably go to taverns to
do exactly that, goes too far.1 64 Tavern patrons who want to get drunk will get
drunk and, while doing so, will often conceal their intoxication level from
tavern employees so as not to be "cut off."
Another argument for first-party causes of action is that allowing
intoxicated patrons to sue serving taverns would reduce drunk driving.
Allowing first-party lawsuits increases theoretically the incentive for tavern
employees to behave responsibly. This argument is also misguided. The
problem with this reasoning is that the purported increased incentive for tavern
employees to behave responsibly greatly reduces the incentive for patrons to
behave responsibly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite its brevity, the supreme court's opinion in Tobias v. Sports
Club, Inc.,165 logically succeeded the opinion of the court of appeals. The
supreme court implicitly agreed with the policy rationale that led the court of
appeals to allow contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as
affirmative defenses-that individual responsibility andpersonal accountability
should be favored over dependency and paternalism.
Opponents of first-party causes of action must concede that injuries to
intoxicated patrons are as foreseeable as injuries to third parties and that

percentage" of them "possess the means to keep their drinking problems secret").
162. See WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 66.20.320 (West Supp. 1999) (mandating that the
state's alcoholic beverage control board regulate "arequired alcohol server educationprogram").
163. Given the potential ofcriminal penalties and the risk of lawsuits by third parties,
one might say that tavern owners already are charged with the responsibility to ensure that no
one gets drunk at their taverns.
164. Realizing that its employees were unable to observe carefully the intoxication
levels of all of its patrons during busy periods, one Ohio tavern hired a private security firm to
perform the task. See Julia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop Liability: Should the Intoxicated
Person Recoverfor His Own Injuries? 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 240 & n.130 (1987). While this
solution is commendable, it would not be feasible for many taverns. Measures such as these
should not be required as "the cost of doing business" in order to protect against lawsuits by
intoxicated patrons.
165. 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 16

1120

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1095

statutes controlling alcoholic beverages impose a duty on bartenders and
servers not to serve intoxicated patrons, regardless of whom those statutes are
intended to protect. Apparently recognizing these considerations, the supreme
court did not address foreseeability or duty, but focused instead on the central
role intoxicated patrons play in causing their own injuries. If the supreme court
had simply denied certiorari to the Tobias plaintiffs, lower courts would
presumably decide future first-party tavern liability cases under the law of
comparative negligence, with the jury apportioning fault between the
intoxicated patron and the serving tavern. However, by eliminating first-party
causes of action, the supreme court has effectively held that adult patrons who
voluntarily drink beyond the point of intoxication are, as a matter of law in
every case, at least fifty-one percent at fault.
The supreme court's holding reflects the court's belief that criminal
penalties and the risk of third-party actions maintain the existing incentive for
responsible behavior by tavern owners, while the elimination of first-party
actions would increase the incentive for responsible behavior by patrons.
Because the rule established by the court is based on solid policy
considerations, and because the rule properly distributes the incentive to control
irresponsible drinking between the tavern owner and the tavern patron, the
supreme court achieved the best possible resolution of the first-party tavern
liability issue. In sum, despite its lack of published reasoning, the supreme
court correctly decided Tobias.
Sean A. O'Connor
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